Abstract. We find that in Chinese listed non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs), if CEOs have political affiliations or family connections, their jobs are securer with poor firm performance and there is a synergistic effect of the two social backgrounds on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity (TPS). Politically affiliated CEOs' face lower TPS if they are in superior performed non-SOEs, economic downturns, or non-SOEs with politically affiliated other managers. However, no such effects are found in listed SOEs.
Introduction
CEOs are key decision-makers, and replacing a CEO entails a change in corporate strategy [1] . Correspondingly, CEO turnover is an effective constraint mechanism that business owners impose on their agents to improve corporate governance [2] . In firms with effective corporate governance, shareholders and board of directors (BOD) decide whether to dismiss their CEOs based on firm performance [3] . Because of the institutional environment of China, shareholders of non-SOEs exhibit a preference for immediate profit and emphasize short-term performance when evaluating their CEOs [4] . However, in accordance with resource dependence theory, CEO social backgrounds, including political affiliations and family connections are critical firm social capital. Such CEO social backgrounds can provide firms with tax incentives [5] , advantages in financing [7] and other gains. Undoubtedly, an advantageous background enhances a CEO's value to a firm and thus affects CEO turnover. Resources are limited in developing countries, such as China, and these countries often lack effective resource-allocation systems. Financial channels, property protection, and industry entry opportunities differ considerably between SOEs and non-SOEs. Non-SOEs have to seek alternative external resource channels. Therefore, whether the social backgrounds of CEO can impact CEO TPS in non-SOEs is a question, which needs further study.
Literature Review and Research Hypotheses
CEOs play a pivotal management role in firms and are responsible for firm performance. For the information asymmetry between board of directors and CEO, a CEO's capability cannot be directly observed and firm performance is the benchmark for evaluating CEOs, and determining whether they should continue to serve in the CEO role. Consequently, CEO TPS is generally negatively. Capable CEOs enhance firm performance, thereby gaining the confidence of shareholders and maintaining their positions. When the performance of a firm is poor or below the expectations of the shareholders and the BOD, shareholders and BOD question the capability of the CEO, and they may dismiss the CEO to improve corporate governance and cut their losses [8] . Numerous studies assert that CEOs are replaced not because of true lack of ability, but rather because they become scapegoats for poor firm performance [9] . A decline in firm performance is often the result of poor overall corporate governance rather than an incompetent CEO, suggesting that CEO turnover does not necessarily improve performance. However, without a suitable alternative course of action, shareholders may treat a firm's CEO as a scapegoat [10] . Actually, as the highest executor of daily affairs, CEO should assume liabilities for the defective corporate governance.
CEO TPS is affected by CEO and firm traits. The greater the power of the CEO has [11] , or the higher proportion of independent BOD [12] , the lower probability of a CEO being dismissed for poor performance decreases. Similarly, CEO TPS is also affected by CEO social backgrounds, especially political affiliations and family connections. Political affiliations are a means for firms to acquire scarce resources. Firms often maintain close ties with government actors to gain various scarce resources. CEOs with political affiliations can leverage their backgrounds to benefit the business activities of their firms and achieve development objectives [14] . Thus, CEOs with advantageous political affiliations are challenging to replace, even if firm performance declines under their leadership or they enact major investment decisions that yield poor results. A family-style management approach is commonly observed in listed non-SOEs. Similar to CEOs' political affiliation, family connections enable CEOs to procure scarce resources, reducing the CEO's substitutability and in turn affecting CEO turnover. Family-run firms are oriented toward long-term operations [15] . To ensure stable operations [16] , a family-run firm is unlikely to dismiss a CEO who is a member of or connected to the family, even if short-term firm performance is unfavorable [17] . When CEO possess family connections, they are less likely to be replaced for poor performance in non-SOEs. Based on this discussion, we propose our hypothesis: In listed non-SOEs, any one of CEOs' social backgrounds significantly inhibits CEO TPS.
Research Design
We use the Chinese A-share non-SOEs data from 2005 to 2015 from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research database. We select the directly listed non-SOEs to reduce the interference of ownership-related factors, exclude ST, *ST, and financial firms, hand-collect incomplete information about managers, and exclude firms with incomplete data. For firms that replaced their CEOs multiple times in a year, we keep the first turnover observation and obtain 7,399 firm-year observations.
We use Model (1) to examine whether CEO social connections affect CEO TPS. To ensure the robustness of the results, all regressions are performed in both Probit and Logit models. Social represents a CEO's social backgrounds, including political affiliations (Politic) or family connections (Family). Social*ROA is the cross-multiplier to account for the moderating effect of CEO social background on CEO TPS. To reduce endogeneity, we use the ROA in Time t-1 to measure firm performance. We measure CEOs' political affiliations following the general method [18] . If a CEO is currently or formerly a government official, a representative of the Provincial People's Congress, or a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, we set Politic to 1; otherwise, Politic is equal to 0. For CEOs' family connections, following previous study [2] , for CEOs with family connections, who are family members or controlling shareholders, we set Family to 1; otherwise, the value is 0. Similar to previous study [19] , if there is a forced CEO turnover at Time t during the research year, Turnover is equal to 1; otherwise, Turnover is equal to 0. Also, we control firm size (Size), asset turnover rate (Tat), asset-liability ratio (Lev), proportion of independent directors (IDR), CEO duality (Dual), CEO education (CE), industry and year fixed effects. Considering the particularity of political affiliations for Chinese non-SOEs, we focus on political affiliations in the rest of our research. First, from the column (5) and (6), we find there is a preference difference for political affiliations of CEOs in non-SOEs with various performing. In the high-performance group the cross-multiplier is positively significant at 1% significance level. It suggests that higher performing non-SOEs value the maintenance of government-business relationships and CEOs' political affiliations are more influential in securing CEO positions in these firms. Next, we examine the influence of the macroeconomic environment on the relationship between CEO political affiliations and CEO TPS. The coefficients of Politic*ROA during upturn periods in column (7) does not exhibit statistical significance. For the downturn periods, the coefficients of Politic*ROA in column (8) is significant and positive at 10% significance level. These results suggest that macroeconomic circumstances impact the value of political affiliations for non-SOEs. In economic downturn, political affiliation is more important and a CEO with such affiliations is less likely to be replaced for poor performance.
Results
The following regression results are reported in Table 2 . Furthermore, we group samples by whether firms' BOD core members or executive managers possess political affiliations to examine the joint effect of other managers' and CEOs' political affiliations on CEO TPS. Column (1) and (3) in Table 2 present the results of BOD members or executive managers with political affiliations and the column (2) and (4) present the results of BOD members or executive managers without political affiliations. The coefficients of Politic*ROA in column (1) and (3) are significant and positive at 5% significance level. Obviously, BOD members or executive managers with political affiliations are more lenient in their monitoring of politically affiliated CEOs than those without political affiliations. In listed non-SOEs without politically affiliated BOD members or executive managers, political affiliations of CEO in these firms do not contribute to the security of the CEOs' positions. Additionally, to confirm the effect of CEO political affiliations on CEO TPS in Chinese listed non-SOEs, we conduct the above regression on SOEs for the same time range and the results show in column (5) and (6) in Table 2 . We find that in the listed SOEs, CEO turnover is remarkably influenced by firm performance, and the effects of political affiliations on CEO turnover are less evident. Finally, we perform a robustness test using the instrumental variable and two-stage least squares estimation. T-2 ROE data are adopted as the instrumental variables for t-1 ROA, and regressions are grouped by whether CEOs have political affiliations, which reveals that firm performance influences CEO turnover in the non-politically affiliated CEO group as shown in column (8) . These results are identical with our findings and suggest that endogeneity does not influence our empirical findings. 
Summary
We prove the effects of CEOs' social backgrounds on CEO TPS. We also find that under various conditions, namely internal corporate resources structures, the preference from various firm performances, macroeconomic environment and the nature of firm ownership, firm exhibit different preferences on CEO political affiliations. We try to elaborate the decision-making processes of CEO turnover in non-SOEs using CEOs' social backgrounds.
